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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
)
JEREMY COOK,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
________________________________)

NO. 43258
CANYON COUNTY
NO. CR 2014-27455
APPELLANT’S
REPLY BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In his opening brief, Mr. Cook argued that the district court abused its discretion
by sentencing him to a unified term of ten years, with four years fixed, in light of the
mitigating factors that exist and by denying his motion pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule
35 (“Rule 35”) for reduction of sentence. In response, the State argues that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Mr. Cook. The State also argues that
this Court should affirm the denial of Mr. Cook’s Rule 35 motion because Mr. Cook did
not present any new or additional information in support of his motion and, even if he
did present such information, Mr. Cook “has still failed to establish an abuse of
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discretion.”

(Resp. Br., p.4.)

The State is incorrect.

The district court abused its

discretion by imposing upon Mr. Cook an excessive sentence and by denying his Rule
35 motion, which was supported by additional information. This Court should vacate
Mr. Cook’s sentence and remand for resentencing.
ISSUES
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed upon Mr. Cook, a
unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed, in light of the mitigating
factors that exist in this case?

2.

Did Mr. Cook present additional information to the district court in support of his
Rule 35 motion and, if so, did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied
that motion?
ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Upon Mr. Cook, A
Unified Sentence Of Ten Years, With Four Years Fixed, In Light Of The Mitigating
Factors That Exist In This Case
The State’s response concerning this issue is not remarkable and, as such, no

reply is necessary. Accordingly, Mr. Cook refers the Court back to his opening brief for
his argument on this issue. (See App. Br., pp.3-5.)
II.
Mr. Cook Presented Additional Information To The District Court In Support Of His Rule
35 Motion And The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied That Motion
In his opening brief, Mr. Cook argued that the district court abused its discretion
when it denied his Rule 35 motion in light of the additional information he submitted to
the court. (App. Br., p.5.) Mr. Cook acknowledged the district court’s statement that he
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did not file any additional information in support of his motion, and argued that
statement was incorrect. (App. Br. at 5.) In its brief, the State contends that Mr. Cook
provided “no ‘new’ information in support of his Rule 35 motion.” (Resp. Br., p.3.) The
State argues Mr. Cook’s denial that he was the person eluding police was before the
district court at sentencing and thus was not new or additional information. (Resp.
Br., p.3.) The State is incorrect—this information was not before the district court at
sentencing and thus, it was additional information.

The district court should have

considered this additional information and reduced Mr. Cook’s sentence.
At sentencing, counsel for Mr. Cook argued that Mr. Cook “has two problems”—
specifically, “some degree of cognitive dysfunction” and “substance abuse.” (Tr., p.10,
Ls.9-14.)

Mr. Cook’s counsel talked in detail about the circumstances surrounding

Mr. Cook’s prior conviction in California. (Tr., p.10, L.17 – p.13, L.23.) He also argued
that Mr. Cook had never had substance abuse treatment and requested that the district
court retain jurisdiction and allow Mr. Cook to participate in a rider. (Tr., p.14, L.15 –
p.17, L.8.) Mr. Cook apologized for his “stupid, stupid decision” and stated he “would
really appreciate . . . a chance at a program.” (Tr., p.17, L.14 – p.18, L.3.) Neither
Mr. Cook nor his attorney addressed the charge of eluding police and neither raised any
challenge to the information contained in the police reports or the potentially false
identification of Mr. Cook as the person who was eluding police.
After the district court heard from Mr. Cook and his counsel at sentencing, the
court discussed the eluding conduct in great detail and described Mr. Cook as “a danger
to the community” and his conduct as “particularly egregious.” (Tr., p.19, L.15 – p.20,
L.2; p.22, L.12 – p.23, L.1.) The district court did not exercise any caution, let alone
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“due caution,” in relying on the dismissed charge, and did not give Mr. Cook or his
counsel a chance to respond. This was an abuse of discretion. See State v. Barnes,
121 Idaho 409, 411 (Ct. App. 1992) (stating a sentencing court must exercise “due
caution” in considering mere allegations of criminal conduct at sentencing).
Mr. Cook made seven arguments in support of his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.6264.) First, he argued that the police officer described the person eluding police as
wearing a dark-colored sweatshirt, while he was wearing a very distinctive black
sweatshirt with a yellow hood and yellow lettering. (R., p.62.) Second, he argued that
the police officer described the person eluding police as leaving the Rodeo Bar, but he
was at the Sportsman Bar. (R., p.62.) Third, he argued that the police officer described
the person eluding police as having a motorcycle without a license plate, but his
motorcycle has a license plate.

(R., p.62.)

Fourth, Mr. Cook argued that he was

intoxicated and could not have been driving a motorcycle as described by the officer
who saw a motorcyclist eluding police. (R., p.62.) Mr. Cook also pointed out that he did
not have gloves and sunglasses, which the person eluding police had, and there were
twenty or so people riding bikes in the same general area earlier in the day. (R., pp.6263.) Fifth, Mr. Cook stated he understood his plea bargain to be for a unified sentence
of five years, with two years fixed. (R., p.63.) Sixth, Mr. Cook stated that the police
reports are full of errors which call into question their veracity. (R., pp.63-64.) Mr. Cook
also stated he was at the garage/shop, not eluding police, and explained why he fled
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when confronted by the police.

(R., p.64.)

Finally, Mr. Cook argued he received

ineffective assistance of counsel.1 (R., p.64.)
The information set forth above is not contained in the PSI or the police reports
attached to the PSI. The PSI does not state that Mr. Cook denied being the person
eluding police and does not identify any potential issues with the police reports. (PSI,
pp.1-28.) The police reports generally reflect that Mr. Cook denied being the person
eluding police, and indicate that there was another potential suspect, but the information
is not nearly as detailed as that set forth by Mr. Cook in support of his Rule 35 motion.
(PSI, pp.34, 37-38, 39-40, 41-42.) Moreover, the district court did not inquire into the
eluding conduct at sentencing and thus had no way of knowing whether Mr. Cook still
denied the eluding conduct.
Mr. Cook presented additional information to the Court in support of his Rule 35
motion. The district court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Cook’s motion where it is
clear that it sentenced Mr. Cook for an offense that was not before the court and
considered the existence of alleged criminal activity without due caution. See, e.g.,
State v. Findeisen, 133 Idaho 228, 229 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding the district court abused
its discretion where it “went beyond [its] authority and essentially imposed sentence for
offenses other than the one that was before the court”). The proper remedy is for this
Court to vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. See id.

Mr. Cook recognizes that his fifth and seventh arguments do not provide a basis for a
reduction of sentence under Rule 35.

1
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above as well as those set forth in Mr. Cook’s opening
brief, this Court should reduce Mr. Cook’s sentence as it deems appropriate or vacate
that sentence and remand for resentencing.
DATED this 20th day of January, 2016.

___________/s/______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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